may be interesting to review in the-context of informal international lawmaking. I will use examples of Switzerland to b'l.Se my anaJysis.
As a resu lt o f these d evelopme nts, such accountability measures have g rad -uaJiy formalized non-b inding acts, so that they are no longer merdy inform:;a_l (section D ).
C. 1.n we obSC'r\'e the same tendency in the international law? In this Volume. the tam 'informal' international bwma.king (IN-LAW) is used in contrast to the •traditio nal' intcrn:ltiona.l lawmaking.5 Does it mean tlut one &ty perl-ups the •informal' m ethod will become as tr.tditional as the current o ne? T h is C hapter will (e;tve this questio n o pen. Why. then, should soft: bw be kept accountable if non-binding? BCClusc a review of these acts h:ts shown th:lt soft law c.t:n produce legal effects to a d egree. lnternatio n:;a_l law specialists recog nize this:7
The non-binding nature of rccommC"ncbtions docs not mean they arc without impact. If this were the case, there would be li ttle ground for the fierce de-bates ICJding to their adoption."' A State can therefore ind uce individuals to d1angc their behaviour without forcing their hand thro ugh rules of law. R.ecent studies in social psychology "and affective psychology arc of great intercst in understanding this mcchani. sm.9 (2) Gradual normativity L.q;:;tlliternture recognizes th: n soft: bw's elfects arc lcga]ly rd evantlO d espite their lack of bind ing force in principlc. 11 Some "authors have therefore deduce-d the need to shift the bound aries of law 1 2 in o rder to enh: mcc the legitimacy of these acts and their lcg;il protection.
Soft law presents a specific norm:ttivity 1 3 consisting of vario us degrees, includ ing binding ness, which we will d iscuss below.
(11) Direct binding tjfoct
Let us begin with a phenomenon that seems parad oxical "at fi rst glance: depending o n circumstances, soft law c.tn have a bind ing legal dTect, thereby losing its non-9 A FI Ucki~r. ·Why Do Wc Obey Soft Uw~' in S Nahr.uh and F Vuonc (eds). RtdiJ ((It'l' rin, t. Public law n11d f>ltb!ir Admi11iltr.tJio11 in Cttmparlllit'l' Po/{() ('I'J(IIt?: tin &i1mg zur Hnndlungforrnm-und zur R('(htst'i'rhiiknislthrt im lltru~ltunqrttht (Helbing l.Khrenh.ahn Vc-tlag. B:ud 2001 ) 1 72~ P Tschannen, 'Amtliche Wunungen und EmptChl un~en ' (1999) 118 RDS(II) 399> P Mahon, 'L'inlorm. u ion pu IC' S autorirCs ' (1999) 118 RDS (II) 247: A Fllkkiget, li'Xumi (lll du amtr61t juridicti(ltJ11d In artivitls dt /'admillistr.tJioll (St.impBi, Bc-m 1998) 9: H Pfcnningcr. Ruht/id~ Asp&tt drs i11jorrntllm VnuVIftunohmuMm (Editions Uniwrsiuirc.s. Fribourg 1996) 186: M Sdmhe. Sihfithus l'mtoa!tu,gJumddll (Moht s;c.beck. Tiibin~n 1995) 30: M Miilkr and T MUikr-Ctaf. 'St:utliche Empfchlungcn: Ged:1nken ru Rechrschltaktc-t und Grundtech urdc~'.lnz' (199S) 114 RDS (II) 3S7; P NUu:i. Rtthzsft. tgm t'i Zltlo!sigkrir, H..tfru11g: i//us.trim dll dm fkispitft· 11 AIDS tmd Lisuriost(Sumpfli.lkrn l99S) 117 (State informl tion); S fierrcn, Faktisc~ fkrinJriithtiguJtttll drr Poliliuhm Grtmdrtd!rr (Ru~r, Coirc 1991) 48: P Richli, ·Offcmlich·rcchtlich.r Problerrdx·1 <kr Erffillung \'On Suawufetbc-n nm lnfotmlriorumiud n ' (1990) 109 RDS (I) IS7 (Stare infotmlrjon}: R Phnnet·Steinmann, f..,tsJfhliflxs VmiNlftullgs/.\mddn Quris-V<rlag. Zurkh 1990)42, 76. 98. 188. 11 · bti11g law and ha\'ing ltgnl tffict must be distinguished• ;J.S ~plai ned in Chap<er 6 (Pauwdyn). 1~ CA Mor.tnd. lt Dr(t;, NhHnodtrllt dn Politiqtm Publiques (Ubt.tiric GCnCrak dc Droit et de Jutisprudc-nce, P;tris 1999) t7S, lS I. 1 > (lr.lrul'Cenain ptoposals 1hll 2re sometimes erC'Scnted ;J.S notmlrjn· appeu not to comajn any direct or C'\'cn indiroct commlnd. Thjs is th-C' c.ue with ad, ice and ~mmcndations. Until the b:st f(".\• dec-add, rccommendltioru by ouuide 1he Doun<brics ofbw. 1 ... 1 the inititl temptation is to discbim lhat 1hey h2ve an)' norm:ui\'e ' authority. And for 2 good re3SOn: they p~ribc n()(liing binding. Bur we can also conceiw of choosi n~ 1he opposite attitude. [ .. . 1 Should we then admit to 1he molt" or kss o:ccptionli existence of non-1mpcr.111\'C no rms~ If not, docs this mean we must b:1nish all ksof1 law" ftom the 6dd of ~rt'".d'' Uw~ \'<'e would be bene-t ot-T choosing the middle puh. which consists of idemi(ving an imecr.tli\' C' component wilhi.n thc inciremcn1, bur rocognizing ns sped6c normati\'it)·.' D <k 6ttllillon, </.If 'tiNt qu 'tmt rig/t dr droi.t? (Odik J:Kob,. P;tris 1997) 190. im perative nature. An act that b egin s as a non-bin d ing in strument becomes binding. This exce ptional dTect m:ty :;~.rise either fro m a st-:ttutory or legal rcfcrcnc:c or from the principle of good faith.
Fcdcr:1l law uses this type of d ausc to empower the Fcdcr:1l Council 'by means of an ordinance, rto) declare indi\'idual parts of the foodstuffs manual to be binding•, which normally Ius the value of a recomme ndation under law (An id e 22(3} of the Federal Act on Foodstuffs and U tility Anidcs 1 4 in relation to Anide 22(2} t hereof).
A rC"CCmmcndation may h.: we to take the fonn o f a lqrJ ;let, -:lS with t he ~ation of the N :uion:tl Centres of Competence in RCSC'arch, in which case the Swiss N :uion :~l Science Fo undation, after examining a request and deciding not to recommend the crc-atjon of a cenuc of competence in research, informs its authors of that conclusion t hrough a dC"Cision {A..rtide Sd(l} of the Ordomwru rrlmiw il Iii loi sur Ia 1wl!m·h~).' ~ C:.tse law may also r« ogni:.:c a r·estrictive eff«t based on t he p rincip le of good f.ljth (An ide 5(3) and Anicle 9 of the C onstitution. o r Cst), as i n the example of informltion p rovided by government :1nd on which citiU'ns em rdy, depending on the circumstlnce s. Wc might wonde r to wh1t degree an :luthority that :;~.dopts a soft law let is b inding itself and wo uld be hdd to 1pp ly those c riteria-criteria on which the l:tw's s ubjects might legitimately base' themselves.
In competition bw, legal scholars accord ingly deem that t he Competition Commission is obligated, o n the basis of good t:-.jth, to apply the criteria that it has adopted and published in non·bindjng acts, called communic:.tioJU (Article (I} of th e Federal Act on Cartds and ot her Rcstrajnts of Competjtion, or lCart). 16 • 17 In public international law, however, recommendatjons cannot be opposed to States du t voted in good faith to adopt them. At th e most, St-ates tlut voted in this manner -are prohibited from criticizing other States for applying s uch rc-commendations. 18 F ina.Jiy, we add~ss non-binding acts thlt a re li mited to rcclpit ubting existing rules of law. T h e i mper.ttiveness of such texts de rives d i rectly fro m t he let being rc pC'3tcd.
In domestic law, recapitulative administ.r:ujve ordinances -are the aim; 19 in public international law, acts synthesize -a custom. tu Jn both c-ases. the no n-binding-act it.sdflus no legal eACct.
14 Oassificd Compilation of Fcder.tl Legislation CC S 17.0. CC texts can be consulted on the Swiss go\-cmmcm website. A (small) portion of the lcgisbtion existS in English <hnp:lfwww.admin.chlchlci rs/ll.html> 2<:ccsscd 28 J:tmtuy 2012. 1~ CC420.11. " cc 2)1.
1 7 J·M Rcymond. 'ad an. 6 Lcart' in P T ercier ;and C Bowt (eds). C(ll1m1l'llldir~ Rimuvui-DroiJ d~ In C(lll ('fU't'rllu: loi SliT In Cartds, IAi sur Ia Sun'l'illnnu de; Prix, l(li SliT 1~ Mnrd.Ji lmirirur, l(li SJtY IN EnJr, wts Tttlmiqurs au n, m, U'n:t: nnm1l'tif 
(b) Indirect binding effrct
Soft bw acts lc-g:;t]ly b ind their subjects through indirect elfect in "all scenarios whe rethe authority responsible for app lying the non-b ind ing 'l.Ct is bound by it, while the pr iva te individ ual is not. Typically the re-commendation is b inding only for :;~.uthoriti es, n ot fo r individ uals. The re are several e xample-s of th is in the leg:;a_l sphere.
(i) Non-binding acts as administrative ord inances Cert-ain unilateral non-b inding "acts may be described as administrative o rdin : m ce-s (instruc tions). In this Cl.SC', the act becomes b inding for authorities, b ut remains non-binding for individuals.
T he rttommencbtions o f the Federal Council on winter smog prevention are d escribed :LS an administrative ordinance that ' the appt' opri:ne decision-makers will usc r ... ) in their decisions, pn:wid ed the specifi c circumstances o f a p:uticubr case do not w:ur:mt an exemption'. 1 1 (ii) Binding indirect impera tivene-ss dausc-.s T h e law, in deed the C onstitutio n, can set out speci:;a_( cbuscs that, without d ire ctly :lttributing legal effects to non-binding acts, confe rs upon them 'l.n inAuen ce of va rying scope. The modd of the b inding indire ct imper:ttiven ess cbuse found in law is as follows:
' Decision X must comply with rC"COmmendation Y. • T hus, the law indirectly confers imperativeness, through d ecisions, o n "acts that :;~.rc not imper:ttive pe-r se.
\'<'hen he:t\)'-currem electrical installations are being built, 'the rules of the technique, partic:ubrly the technical recommendations of the Swiss :tSSociation of dectric power producers and distributors ( ... 1 must be followed'.ll ' Import penn its for live 3nim:1ls ... captured in narure shall be issued if the conditions set out in the C ITES (Convention on International T rade in Endangered Species of \X'ild F3una and Flora) are mC't and if the facilities for sheltering the animals meet the rC"COmmend:uions of the techniCll commission.'l3 (iii) The inclusion of non-binding texts in leg;t1 acts A non-binding te.xt m ay be par r. of 'l. m'l.ndatory act .. This is the case with recomme ndations contained in a law, although ClCamples a rc infft.que nt:
In \·ehicubr traffic law, 'the low-be:un headlighu or d:l)'time running lights of motor vehicles should (:1nd not mustl be mmed on c\'en during the day• (Article 31 (5) In wine bw, a legisbtive ordinance specifies that vine v.tricties X_, Y, :and Z '-:lte rC"COm· mended for cultivation in Switterland' . l~ One lcg."ll ei-Tcct of this formalization is that othe r a u thorities will lose the jurisd iction to enact a bw with divergent content if there is a h icrnrchical o r supervisory relatio nsh ip between the au thor o f the lcg;tl act and o ther au thorities.
In the above example of the rccommcn.d:ltion to turn on running lights for daytjme driving, fo und in ;1 tCder:ll gon·rnme nt ordin:mce, the federal government (the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. for ex:a.mple) will no Ionge!!' h.: we the right to rC"CCmmend that drivers turn oA' headlights d uring the day. since the government, as an ;luthority with hierarchical power, has settled the matter.
(iv) Definition of the jurisdiction to ena ct a non-bind ing act within a legal act An incretSing numbe r of legislative texts a rc d etermin ing the jurisd iction to enact soft laws.
In e nvironmenul law, for example, e nvironmenul protection services ·~com m end the adoption of measures to re-duce pollutio n'l6 and the Swiss Expc'rt Committee for Biosafety "may issue recommendations ' .l7 In this c.t..se. the autho rity is bound by the rule of law granting it jurisd ictio n to enact non-b inding 'lCts, in the sense th'lt it is r<'quircd to act within the sco pe of th'lt ju risd ictio n.
The bw e m also include this type o f recommend ation in a m ore gencr.a.l procedural frnme'\'.'o rk by req uiring that reco m m endation issu ance be a preliminary phase of a process leading to the adop tion o f 'l legal act.
In the :a.rca offederal institutes of technology, a joint committe<' responsible fo r re\'iewing job C'V:lluations must issue dassi6catiOon recommendations when job e\·alu:nions are conteste-d. T hese recommendations -;'In" sent to the institute of technology, among others, which must render a new dassi6cation dC"Cjsion.la This scenario occurs when law stipulates that a legal act can only be ado pted when •proposed' or ' recommended' by anothe r autho rity.
In international law, we can cite the enmple of the -;1ppointment of the Secret3ty-Gener:ll of the United Nations: 'The Secreu.riat .si'UJI comprisco -;1 Secretary-General and such sutf-;1s the O rg:lnization may require. T he SC"Cretaty-Cener:tf shall be appointed by the General be attacked :30 fil iling to consult the Price Jnspcctor, as required under Anid e 14 of the federal act on price inspection ( Loiftdimlt' conanliwt In sun't'i!lnnct" tin prix).3l constitutes a vio b.tion of fed eral law}2 Jn this case, a non-binding act is a prerequisite to ad opting a m andatory act ('conditional act').
(v) Authorization efkct (permisshle-value) Non-b ind ing unilateral acts m ay h ave a permissive vaJue in the sen Se" that they fo rm ally state a behaviour's lawfulness. From the stand point o f the act's subjects, they legitimiU' the action o f those who follow the recommend:ltion.33 T he execution rccommenc6tion (or the Ordomwnrr fidim!t" Jlir le rtl)YIHfJl'fllt'llf mm ionimnt stipulates that 'if enforcement authorities take it into account, they may :usume that the)'3te complying with tCder3l law. Other solutions 3te not excluded: in accordance with C3Se law. however. they must be pto\·en co nsistent with b\\'•)4
It would in F.tct be d ifficu lt for a • Coun to re proach a d river fo r c.tusing damage when --or, m o re accurately, becau se-they complied with a State recommendation. Such a judgment m ight be arbitrary. In pr incip le, the subjects o f non-bind ing unilateral acts do no t commit an o i-TenCC" by respecting them. Jf they nonetheless commit an oi-TenCC". this would me:tn that the act itself is contrary to law. This ei-Tect implies that such acts should be: controlled by leg;il proc«<<ings when their compatibility with existing legal st:tndards is questioned.
In public international bw, the pennissiw ~ue of rttommendations is acknowledged. A St3te's international liability cannot. in panirular, be sought if it is acting in accordance with the recom m e ndation )~
(3) Non-binding effect Contr.try to th e b ind ing effects d iscussed in section B(2). non-b inding effect is characteristic of soh b.w acts. Although their su bjects arc not required to follow them, these acts have a true sco pe that, tho ugh varying in intensity , is n rdy nil in practice ( B{3)(a)). The legal system may aJso institute various legal mechan isms intended to enhance compliance w ith such acts without m:lking them mand atory (B(3)(o)). Their significmCC" shows that non-binding acts need not be legally b inding to be political imperatives-in some ctSes, their de focro dTects can be even greater.
Lc&ll schobrs give the example of W3mings :tg:ljnst f.1ulty products: the necessary publication of a warning (non-binding act), gi"•en the d:1magc to company im:tge, is mon-injurious to the manufacrurtr of the products in question than ;1 simple prohibition of d istribution {mandatory aapa
In p ublic international bw, the ne-ed to maintain positive relations among St:ltes means that viobtion of :1 purdy political commitment can result in retali:uory measurC"s.39 Le-gal liternture h3S thus documented that the legislator cannot completely ignore soft law.40 Even though the Federal C ouncil d efended 'ln o pposite view, 4 1 the aamples of international soft law's effects on Switzerland 's d omestic legislative process can be documented.'ll In any c.t.se, :;although the authority may not fed legally bound, it at least fccls obligated to consid er the q uestion.
ThC' Fe-deral Council has, for exam piC', <lemonst.r.ued this with respect to 3 draft rC"CCmmC"n· dation by the Council of Europe's Committee of lvlinisters on the fUnding of political parties 3nd dC"Ction campaigns, rcp;trdi.ng which it wrote tll3t 'if this rC"CCmmend:uion werC' adopted, it would ~qui re that Swio:erl:tnd also review an C"ntirC" sC"ries of matters, t:..ctoring in such institutional pattirularities 3S collegial governmC"nt, semi-direct democracy, and fC"deralism•.4)
The leg:;tl system h'ls v:1rious mechanisms at its disposal to strengthen the effect of non-binding acts. Although legal in n:lture, these mech'lnisms do not make thC'SC' acts man&ttory. Their subjects remain fi-ee to fo llow them o r not. Depending on Jo6 Sec B(l). In principle. a ·non-binding effect'.
3 7 Fliickigcr (n 9}. 311 K:~ull (n I 0) 86. with references to Getm:ln litc-r. uute; se-e also pp 156 and 28 1: Tsch:~nnen (n 10)432; Nuni (n 10) 181.
" V.r.~lly (n 7) 231. " Thur<r (n 18) 4~0. the p rocess used, the dt" focto constraint may be more o r less powerful. \Vhen strong, it is d ifficult to d istingu ish from legislative restriction in terms of its effects, as witnessed by financial o r regulatory pressure med1anisms, among o thers.
(ii) Financial pre.ssure Financial pressure may cany varying degrees of fo rm alization . It is most fo rmalized in economic instruments, and le:J.St form;;a_lized in retaliatory m easures.
As archetypes of formalized financial constraint, incentive tax:ltion includes leg:;Jiy non-binding recommen d ations as wdl as payment o f a sum o f m on ey. Such ;;a_n ap proach is two--p ro nged : one compon ent is imperative, while the other is not. The behaviou r advocued in theSe' acts is not mandatory in the leg:;tl sense, b ut is simply rcc:ommend ed. Yet an individual who chooses n ot to sort waste must pay a t:lX in Swiss cantons that tax the refuse per bag (the waste o wner pays a t:lX o f a few &.mcs per bag fo r removal). Conceptually. subjects m ay perceive this derived o b lifjltion as a finan cial penalty very similar to legal penalties. This debate shows the ambiguity o f the very concep t of penalty.44 the bound;;a_ries o f which c;m be said to f.tde when a pub lic contribution is collected to d iscou rage th e taxed activities. 4) 'JCih en a recommen datio n is p:tired with State subsid ization , the economic incentive is a variant of financial p ressure. In this case, the « onomic incentive strengthens the recommen datio n . Although compliance with the subsid izcod behaviour remains within the free will o f the subjects, th e de focto constraint increases commensurate with the amount at stake. \Vhen sizeab le, it gives the underlying r« ommendation a force that can r<'ach a virtually b inding elfect.
T hus, the free will of a F.trmer who grows grains with non-green methods is hampered to the dcgte<' that his income dcpcnds on tlut cultivation; if hc continues to F.trm in an cnvironmentall)' countcrproducti\·e manner, he will lose entidemcm to the corrcsponding subsid ies and the eronomic \·i.lhility of his enterprise will bc jC"'pardized.
Of course, the above analysis ap p lies only to subsid ies no t yet received and that :;~.im to encournge n on -mandato ry behaviour. It docs not apply to State financial su ppo rt fo r b in d ing leg;;a_l :lets, n o r does it concern the relationship between :luthor ities and the subsidized pers-on once the subsidy is paid. Once it is paid, a binding relationship will arise from the subsid y d ecision o r contract.
(iii) Regulatory, d ecision al. or legal pre.ssure The th~:lf o f adop ting regulation s, render ing a d ecision , o r fi ling p roceedings re p resents an incentive to comp ly with a n on -b ind ing act. The more concrete the threat, the more constrictive the effect. Pressure can range &o m a d iA-Usc political th reat, as with non-b ind ing, informal arrangements (gentlemen's agr«m ents) inten ded to avert a regub.tory act, to a m ore leg;1l fo rm of p~s.sure that is nonetheless non-binding, as with 'l. Damodes' b.w, where the thrett to :1dopt rq;ulations keeps subjects in check. 46 From the st:lndpoint of public law, a Damodc.s' law leS3Jiy formal ius pr:tcticcs that have long been inform;;a_l: those non-bind ingagi"C'C'ments concerning'ln exchange of .services betw«n government and citi:.:cns (sometimes d escribed as gentlemen's :lgrt'Cmcnts with public p:micip:ttion47 o r industry-wide agrecmcnts).48
T he first examples studied cmcrgc from the bankjng and fllt:lncial 6dd, with the Swiss N:uion:tl Bank ha\·ing used the expression gentlemen' s agreement since 1930, occasionally for the avowed purpose of avoiding Sta te intervemion. 4 1 In em·ironmental mattC'rs. the federal governmC'nt enacted an ordinance on be\·eragc packaging5<1 spcci~1ng the conditions undcr which authorities will intervene' with morc authoritarian measures if waste prevention and rttyding objectives arc not 3chicvcd through voluntary sdf·regulatory me.1sures. The sword of Damodes. in this ClSC', is thc fcder.tl govcrnmcm's jurisdiction in requiring the m3in companies in question to collcct a deposit on no n·reusablc p:tcbging if thc recycling rate is lower than the recycling objcctives .set.
T hc conccp( was repC" . .ucd to achic\o'e another, morc 3mh itious objective: 3 I 0 per cent rcduction in C0 1 fossil·fud emissions from the 1990 levds by 2010. T he tCdcr..l act on rcducing col emissions (Loi ftdimlr .1111' In rrdttCiiOII des hniuiom dr CO,}) of 8 October 1999,!i 1 fonnalizcd this project by stipubting that t he goals must be :tchicn·d, notably, through fredy assumed me.1sures.S.! T h e :tct includes a threat of regulatory imcn·ention if sdf·regulation in the sector proves indfcctivc: should these mCJsures alonc be insufficient to achieve thc sct objectives, thc Confederation will collect an incentive tax on fossil fuds {Cl.rbon tax)J> T hc Swiss lcgislator resoncd yct ap;tin to :t Damoclcs' law in film legislation to c nsurc a diverse movie offering in SwirlC'rland. The fed eral cinema act {l.oi ftdin& sur /r cinim11, or LCin)!i" requires th:n distribution and projection companies present :t divcrsc offcring, in particubr through joint measures within th e cincma br:mch {Artidc 17(1) LCin). Jf thc tCdcr:ll govcrnment C'\'aluates the oACring and 6nds th:n it is not diversified in a region {too many Holl)'wood blockb usters, for example), then it must make :t rC"CCmmcndation, that is, to 'invite thc d istribution 3nd projection comp:tnies in question to takc corrective measures within :t reasonable time framc' {ltr:lns I Artidc 20(2) LCin). This ~com m endation has no b inding lcg:ll dTC'ct, h ut it does ha\·e a significant de fircfQ effcct. In t:..ct, if the d iversity of thc movic offering is not suhscquently restored in a rcgion within a re.lSonablc time frame, thc ContCdcr:nion may collect 3 tax (A.rtidc 21(1) LCin) of no more than two francs per admission {Artidc 21 (2) lCin), the p:roceeds of which will be uscd to promote a diwrsc oACring in public distribution and projection in the region whcre the ta.'t was collectcd {A..rtidc 2 1 (3) lGn). Thc act therefore introduces a very gt3dual thre.u that gives a great deal of l:ttitudc to ncgoti:tted processes. COoiJC'ction of the tax is only an ttlfimll r.uio, csp«i:tlly ,. CC443.1. since its payers can still avoid it, o nce assessed, should the co mpanies in the sector ' make a fo nnal commitment to the Confedera tion to make a s~cial contribution to the diw rsity and the qu:1lity of the film oACring in a region' {(trans) Article 22{ I) I LCin).
In Europc:1n Unio n law, this type of stand ard f.tlls und er co-rcgu lation,55 'l prO«ss defined by the Interinstitu tio nal Agreement on Better Law-Making {chaptc.r 18 paragraph I) as 'the m echanism whereby a Commun ity legisb tivc :;tCt e ntrusts the attainment of the o bjcctivc-s d efined by the legi.sb tivc 'luthority to pa nic-s which :1rc-re cognized in th< fi eld (sudt 'lS economic Op<'rators, the soci:tl pa rtne rs, non-governmen tal org;m izatio n s. or 'lssocia tio n s)' .56 T he panics :1ffectcd may conclude ' volu ntary agrcc-m e nts' fo r the pu rpo sc of determ in ing practiCll :1rra ngem en ts with in the framewo~ o f the basic lcgisbtivc-'lCt.57 I f the co--regulation process fails to yidd the expcct<d o utco me, the Commission ' reserves the right to m:tke 'l trl.d itional leg islative pro po sal to the legislato r•. 58
T h e fea r o f e nacting :;t lc-g:;t] d ecisio n o pe rates sim ib rly. In this CLSe, the bw grants no n -binding acts a greater effect by granting jurisd iction to m ake a unilatenl decision if the no n -b ind ing act is not fo llowed or is rejected by its subjects. In this CLSe, the reco m me ndation or a rrangeme n t d ocs not beco me mandato ry sinccits subjects rcm;;~.in legally 'free' n o :t to co m p ly . pro vid ed they acce pt the risk of 'l sub seque n t lcg;ll decisio n . Agl.in, the d ecisional thi' C' at serves as the sword o f Dam odes.
In economic law, th e Swiss Takeover Boord has the jurisdiction to issue rC"CCmmendations fo r the bcne6t o f the persons concerned. If those recommendations arc rejected or not observed, the Board must inform the monitoring 3uthority, which may re nder 3 decision {A.nide 23(3) 3nd 23(4) of the Loi mr !t'l /Jtnm.esS 9 and Article 5 of th e Ordomumct" sur les offi· t'l publiqttt'l tliulws). 60 T here is a .simibr mechanism in d:lt3 protection law: if a recommend:ltio n b)' the Federal Dau Protectio n and Information Com missio ner o n the monitoring o f federal agencies is rejected o r breached, the Commissioner may seck 3 decision regarding the matter fro m the department ofcompctcm jurisdiction o r the Fedcr:ll Clu n cd lery (An id e 27{4) and 27 (5) (iv) Civil liability Fe1r of liability for illegal and legal acts is a powerful motiv;~.tion for encouraging individ uaJs or authorities to respect no n-binding acts. Such is the case when a court deems th: u ':1. given recommendatio n, whether public or private, ' :l.p plies in defining the boundaries of negligence or recklessness. In this hypothesis, the tic becomes practically bin d ing through the judgment. ~lly, however, individuals n:main fr« to ad opt other behaviour and will only be 'penali:ted' after the fact, that is, when d amage occurs.
Far of liability is also decisive from the perspective of the author of a nonbinding act, prompting the latter to. enact soft law in :1ccordance with the principles of a rule of law.
Nude.udamage constitutes, within the meaning oflaw, 'the damage ( ... 1 that occurs 3S the result of meJsurcs 1 ... 1 recommended by 3uthoritics in order to avoid or ~duce imminent (v) Non-binding imperativent'Ss clauses Imperativeness chuses arc specific statutory p rovisions that confer a varying dcgr« of imperativeness to a range of non-binding acts, both p ublic and private.
Accordingly. they may formal ly :ascribe a rccommcndationaJ effect by declaring, fo r example, that the act must serve as a decision-making basis for various measures to be taken. The authority is not rc:quin:d to observe the provisio ns of such an :J. ct, but must simply use it in the decision-making proass.
The recommend ationa.l effect m:ay be conferred to an :J.Ct within the ffamewo rk of the autho rity's decision-making or interpretive jurisdiction. The authority 62 CC943.02. 63 T h e recommen&ttion:tl elfect may a ri.se fro m the d uty to state re:tsons for derogations from soft law regulations. In this case, the law structurally integrates the possibility that the act may n ot be respected. a rule of law. Concretely, this mans that an ind ividual who believes he has been prejud iced may seek recourse by 'ltlempting to base himself on a recommendation the content of which hdps interpret certain rules of bw. If the courts refer to the r« ommendation, it will be bo lstered z 'l resu lt.
(vii) Mandatory pc'riodic retrospective-evaluation Making period ic retrospective e'4•alu;~.tion mandatory is one technique that strengthens the inAuence of a non-b ind ing act without 'lCtuaJiy making it binding. This p rocess is used fr<'qucndy i:n public international law in a~as as diverse' as labour law. human rights. disarmament, and economic policy.73 StJtcs accept the oblig;uion to provide e\·aluation repons. answer questionnaires. or juniJY their lateness before political bodies, eXJ>crts, or agencies cre:ned to that end. 74 They subjC"Ct themselves to an assessment process t(H the implementation of a text that they arc not yet obligated to execute.
Trace-s of this process can be found in d omestic bw.
The Federal Act on the Federal Assembly (Parliament Act) authorizes a supervisory committee o r ddeg;..tion to nuke ~commend:uions to the responsible authority that relate to its mandate in the areJ of supervisory control and ~qui res them to noti~· the former 'of the implementation of the recommendatio ns' (Anide 158( I) and 158(2) of the Parliament Act). 7 !i (4) Prejudice to rights, particu!larly human rights More so than the signifiClnce and range of the effc.cts of non-binding acts, legal scho b rs, 'lnd coum?6 have shown~ for a number of years now, how certain nonbinding acts aA-"ect fundamental rights (for example, the guarantC"C' of political rights with respect to information from the authorities in civic matters,n fre"C'dom of religion and conscience with respect to warnings 'lbout sectsls and economic fr«<<om with ~spect to information about ret:lil products??). Consequently, the validity of ~strictions to these fund;~__ment:ll rights must be j udged based on the same criteria as those applied to legal restrictions. which means that they are subject to the requirements of legal basis, public interest. and proportionality (Anicle 36 7 3 D:~ill ;er, Fonc-J.u, and Pdla (n 7} [2491 422. Cst). 8() Mo reover, when the p rejud iCe" to ':1. fundament:ll right is serious. the Constitution a.lso imposes judicial rC' View under Article 35(2) Cst. even for non-bind ing acts: ·~lhoever acts on behalf of the state is bound by fund amental righ ts and is under a d uty to contribute to their implement':l.tion.'SI T his e m even be taken one srtep fu rther to consider that the State's nonimperative activity is subject to the general principiC"s of public law whether o r not fundamental rights ':l.re being prejudiced. Jn fact, why limit the reasoning to constitutionally prot« tc-d rights a:nd not extend it to all rights created for the benefit of citi.:ens, even :;tt the infraconstitutional levd?82 I think this ':l.rgument is :;~.lso n'levant to informal international lawm':l.kjng.
(5) '!be accountability of soft law: a consequence of its effects and its potential prejudice to rights While the legitimacy of hard law results mainly from its ' :l.do p tion p rocesses :;~.nd control measurC"s, the legitimacy of :soft hw I"C'\'ea.ls itsd f to be deficient. This would not pose any particular p ro blem if soft law had no effect. However, we h':l.ve just shown the potential signiflcan cC" o f its impacts.
T o ensure' that soft law is accountable, the thC"sis we are defending Cln be expressed ' :l.S fo llows:
The gre.1ter the degrC'C' to which non-binding State acts prC' judjce a right (wheth er it be intC'rn:uion:tl, constitutional, le&ll• or infra-legal), and/or the more significant the dTects produced. the greatC' r the neC"d to ensure' that .soft bw is dealt with on an equivalent basis with leg:tl acts.
Our formu la derives the conseq uences o f the gradu:;~.l appro ach to the normativity of soft law. Taken to the extreme. th is means that a non-bind ing act must be dealt with in the leg;iJ system in al most the same manner as a legal act when its effects :;~.re virtu':l.lly binding. o r ':l.n' dr focto binding, ':l.nd it significantly prejudices ':1. right. C onversdy, a n on-binding act that does not infringe upon any right may continue to exist free ITom the State•s legal constraints.
It should be specified th':l.t the formula is n ot necessarily cumulative: it may a.lso be necessary to give soft law a treatment th:lt is vinually the same ' :l.S leg."ll :J.Cts if the prejudice to a right is significant but the dTect is sm:;~.ll o r if the effect is significant but the legal prejudice is small. I n the past few years, Swiss law h':l.s gr:td u':l.lly develo ped w:;~.ys to keep soft law p roduction acco untable. C. How can soft-law be kept accountable?83 ( I) Subjection to substantive rules (n) Thr limit"'tiom of lrgitimiZIItion through rffictivenm: rtpplying thr principle of kgnlity to 11011-binding lfcts.
Traditionally, the p rinciple of clfectivcnc.ss (Artidel70 Cst) has justified the USC' of soft law. The USC' of non-b inding acts introduces the flexib ility needed to ensure a proper opcration of the governmen t:l.l machinery. Strict formalism. even when not o:ccs.sivc. certain ly no longer allows for appropri:ndy man:tging mod crn-&ty societies-if it ever did.
H owever. perfo rm:tnce 'l.S so le lc:gitimiution is constitutionally excluded. The princip le of effectiveness f.tlls under the principle of IC:fjllity-rathcr than excluding it-and docs no t c;a_rry the same import:lnc:e :JS other principles of the ru le of law.
The princip le of legality must therefore apply to soft law.
The d iversC" effects of no n-hindi ng acts do not :;t]low fo r :1 definitive verdict on r<'quin:ments rdated to legality. T hus, :IS non-bind ing acts. the long-term effects of an ongoing and insistent information campaign would be similar, based on the writjng of jurists. to those of regulations and would justi~· the requirement of a forma.llqr~ b:tSis, 114 unlike str:ljghtforw~ud inform:ltion without a normauve a1m.
Non-b inding agreements, on the o ther hand, raise ':l specific question as reg':lrds this principle: to what d egree would citizen consent to ':ln :Jrrangement without leg:;t] basis to remedy this Raw? The question is emin ently relevant in the case of :1grccments made to ::tven a leg:;J act (decision or no rmative :let). l.cg3J literature o n ly gives limited sway to such '3 parocess. In ':lddition to the o ther princip les of the rule of law, citizen consent must be obt:lined by lcg;.ll means of pressurc,8> which may be d ebat:lble in the CLSe of ind ustry -wid e agr«ments, the voluntary nature of which h:JS been legitimately questioncd.S6 Refjlrding the pro tection of third parties excluded from the agreement, a mi.n imum lcg;.ll basis appears nccessary.S7 T his is in F.tct the d irection taken by the legislative pr:lctice: Damodes' laws to .set the par:lmete.rs of ind ustry-wide agreemel!lt.S.& cre.nion of .specilic bases in law to rcgul:ue agreements under competition law (:amicable .scttlements} 39 o r in environmental b w concerning the oblip;ujon to make impro\·ements to installations.
A special pbce must be rescrvcd fo r non-binding acts that function as experiment:ll legislation. Many soft b.ws p recede '3 more restrictive intervention in order II) See Tablci9.1 :mel 19.2 11 4 Tsch;mnen (n 10) 423: Moot(n 10) 38. II) Kauu (n 10) 246 and 258: Pfenninger (n 10) 104. 116 Kautz (n 10) 246. 1!7 Pfennin~r (n 10) 106, although, moregener.dly. this author accepts a 'practical rdath'i:t:uion' of the k!l;llity pnnci~s for infornul ~mmu (126). 1111 Sure ':lctivity. o ther means must be sough t. We pro pose that it is to be foun d in the values und erlying the principles of the rule ofhw. Although no State has fo rmally instituted such control oflegitimacy1 many lega)ity reviews and evaluations f.lcto r it in, at least implicitly.92 Little by little.legal scholars have begun to pay attentio n to this matter by proposing specific su:bstantive rules, gener.tlly based on the values of a d emocrntic rule of law. to legitim ize the non-legal action of authorities based on various Clte-go ries of acts. The impe-tus from the leg;tl liter.tture must progre-ssively be consolidated by case law and legislation.
As State rC"Commendations. we would list a d uty of objectivity. broken down into SC'W.r:tl sub-rcquircments9J-inspircd by case: law on politiCll rigJns94-such as t.ranspaffncy. which requires not concCJling the official source of infOrnution, the dut)' of completeness to avoid lying by omission, the requirement of a CC'Main restraint in terms of both style and content to a\·oid n«dle.ss dramatization and to maintain a certain soiC'mnity for offi.cjaJ intC'rventions. the need to base onesdf on a rational :a.rgument conesponding to the statC' of scienti6c knowledge (without concealing the existC'ncc of any discrepanci es),"'~ the duty to respect the pluralism of socjety by refrnining from stigm:nizing certain soci:1l groups% and the d ut)' to correct information that is patC'ntl)' t:.. -Os:t :md Kercho\-e (n 44) 337. " Tschonn<n (n 10) 432; Nurri (n 10) 93, 183. 9.4 Reg:trding the differt-nccs. sec Tsdtan.ncn (n 10) 433. 9 $ For 2 ckatc'r considC'r:~don of minority scicmi6c opinions in sC"ncrJ.I. sec MUller and Miilkr--Gr-.tf (n 10) 387: Tsch:tnncn (n 10) 435 is mor.c Bcxible. Applicuion of the prttJution principle poses 2 probkm from this pcrspeoiw. since it di.rectly quesnons the issue of sciemi6c C'l'idence: On the sciC'nti6c C' lidcnce oppoSed to ltg.ll C'lickncc with respect to this principle. stt A Flikkigcr, ·u Preu\-e recommcnd:uions in public intC' rn:uion :tl l:tw 1 01) o r codes of conduct, 1 0 1 -:lS wit h communications fiom the Competitio n Commission, they introduce confusio n that allows their author to pby o n this ambiguity to Stt• t'ngthcn the d, focto c ACct.
In the area of3~emems-for the p urpose o f prtpa.ring a decisio n in environmental and construction law-we lu vc proposed that the pan ics adopt a code of ethics {ch:uter of COOpc'r.ttion), the implemc:ntatjon of wlhich would be cnu ustcd to a mediator and involving v.uious requirements, including the pro hibition ofe thidly controversial mc-.tns o f pres.sun-, loyalty. rd iability of representatives, the integration of all affected stakeholders, e mpathy, transpare nc)', or solemnity of negotiations. Htl lvlorc gc:neriClll)' ;1n d abstr:lcdy, lcg:1l literature has rC'Ccndy suggestcd considering ;1n :tgrcemcm as consistent with the le-gal ordcr when the four following v:uiables arc dcarly coherent: th e ;l~emen t's content, thc normativc corpus to which the agrecment bclon.gs h)' \·irtuc of its objC"Ct, the \·alues of thc constitutio nal S)'Stem from the ;1ngle of transparc nc)', equality. and conrrol. and the char:lctcristics o f the cconomic and social area of the :rlTectcd stakcholders. 1 1) ·' \'\fith rcspC"Ct to non-m:lndatory planning, we propose to base o ursdves o n the fo undations o f th e principle o f lep;tlit)' (r:uionality, prcdict:thility, and democrac)' in panirular) to fl esh it out through various principles. not:thl)' the requirement for coopcrativc pb n ning in o rde r to guau nt« 30 o pcn, con.scnsual, and panicipatjve process. lo.t
Gcnc rally, we fin d th :lt aU the above p roposals share :1 requ irement commo n to all non-bind ing ac ts: tr:tnsparency and! the publicity o f State action, which also affC"Cts non-bind ing ':lets since the federal a ct on tra nspare ncy ( Loi ftd;m/e mr In trmupart'llt't')l05 a m e in to fo rce, as with legal ':lets that h:;~.ve been targeted by sp« ifi c publicity regu lations sinCC" the gen esis of democratic rules of bw.
T h is claim is also justified on the gro u nds o f e A-Cctiven ess: d ocs the su ccess o f the Price Inspector's or dtc Com petitio n Commission's r« o mme ndations n ot d epend in part on the p ub licity given to their actio ns?106 (r) Other prinripks of n mlr of Wzrv (fublir intrrrst, proportionflli.t;•, equfllil) 
•, and protrrtion agflinst rrrbitrary conduct)
T h e fund amental pr incip les o f a ru le o f b w, wh ich arc p ub lic in te rest, pro po rtionality, eq uality , an d protection ag;tinst ':lrbitrariness, apply to n on -b inding State :Je ts 100 D:UJI;er, Fonc-J.u, and Pd la (n 7) (247) 417. IOI BSchindlcr, 'Ethik£01\'krung in dc-r VeMalrung-Modctrcnd odc-r N01wcndigkeit' (2003) in the same manner as legal acts. IOQ The anaJysis must be conducte-d case-by-case based on the various types of acts and their context. AJthough protection "lgainst arbitrariness poses no specific problem, "l darifiotion is required for the p rinciple of proponio nality. An ex"lmination of the eA-Ccts of non-binding acts shows that they are sometimes mo~ constrictive o r detrimcnt"ll to certain rights than lcg:;a_l acts. 1 08 As such, it is not aJways proportio nate to use nonbinding acts. 1 09 T he pursuit of public interest m.ust be d iscussed, sinCe" it is not always "l simple matter. For ex"lmple, when "l gentlem en's agre'C'ment is mad e to :;tvert the enactment of a law. the interests of the b ranch in question arc not necessarily those of the public. The best indicator is the fact that this type of :;tgre'C'mcnt is reached b~use the par ties fe:1r that the State will e:nact stricter rq;ulations. which are pcrh"lps also mo~ consistent with public i nte~st.
T he principle of equality. on the other hand, may ~quire more Rexibility 11 0 in its applicttion. panicularly fo r the non-binding agreements often mad e in complex situ:ltions little suited to oversimplified so lutions. 11 1 However, the various interested parties must be dealt with equitably in the p reliminary negoti:ttions.ll2
Formal guarantees are necessary in this rq;ard, as we will see in the fo llowing section. Normative texts sometimes explicitly assert application of the p rinciple :lS part of procedures lead ing to the :1d option of non-bind ing acts.
O ne example, now defunct, is that o f the Swiss T-;' lkeover Board 's procedure fo r adopting recommcnd:ujons. The ordinance stjpulated that it must comply with equality of treatment {art ;; para I of the former Ordomumcr 111r !t"J ojfm publique1 tlitduu). 11 J
(2) Subjection to additional procedural guarantees (n) introduction of a decision; o ther wise. the smooth o pcr.1tion of government may be aA-C.cted. It is often indispcns:;~ble for authorities to proceed in formally ' . 114 Having no n -b ind ing acts reach the degree of p roced ur:tl matur ity of legal :lets c.tn o n ly be justified if they are exactly <'qUivalent in their effects, among other aspe-cts. This situ::ttion is therefore r.J.ther rn~ in practice. Formal rules must also be defined based on the signiflc m c:c o f the cffc.cts and the prejudice to rights, an accordance with the formula set out in section B(5)_ll)
(b) Emt'rgence of new forms for non.-binding flt:ts?
In section B we showed the graduaJ formalil:ltion o f no n-binding State acts in the lcg:;J system. One might ask if we arc" no w able to d educe a specific fo rm for th is type of instrum ent. This wo u ld be idol: retSoning based on forms--defined z the o utco m e of a p ro cess-is very uscful because it would involve linking a given :lCt to :1 g iven fo rm . T h is would inst:;amly an d accur.;atdy address formal m:ltters, such :lS procedural req uirements or methods of contro l. 116 Yet th is 'lpprooch h'ls its limits: continuously linking heterogeneous :1cts to 'l specific form Cln only prog ressively weaken them to the point o f rup ture. Perhaps it is time to invent new fo rms for n o n-binding acts in o rder to oA-Cr p ractitioners convenient solutions.
As temp ting as it m:1y seem, such an undert aking would encounter tv.·o obstacles. First, the d iversity o f thesc acts would complicate th eir reductio n to on e o r sever.a.l homogeneous forms. Second, 'llth o ugh this poses serious prob lems in term s of legitimacy. a degree of informality is still n eed ed to ensure the effectiveness of St'lte action and to p revent its paralysis. C re:tting new forms will inC' Vit:lb ly gen erate new in fo rm'llities, unless we 'lre willing to make do with less elfective St'lte action. T he legisbto r h'l.S occtSiona.lly t~en into ':lccount these views by codil)•ing an ad hoc special ad ministr.ttive proce-dure that rules on vi" ually aU of the aspects usually settled in ':ln :1dministrative procedu re law.
The archC'typc was the adoption procedure for recommend:ltions by the Swiss T akC"'ver Board spcci:1Jiy delinC'd in an ordinanc.: tlut has now bcC'n amC'nded in this regard (fonner Ordomumrr sur l.es o_ffm publiqtt~ d'aclmr). 118 which was a true para.lld code of administr:ltiw procedure spcciliCJJiy fo r these rC"CCmmC'ndations. The Supreme Court con6rmC'd the natu re' of this ordC'r :tS lex sptrialiJ i.n comparison with the administrative procedure act {Loi sur Ia proridurr adminisrratiw). 1 1 9-A f.tiled attempt, the draft feder.tl act on the domestic nu.rkct {Loi ftdira/e sur le marchi imh· imr) w.ts designed to force the Competition Commission to comply with the procedural guarantees in the Federal Act on Cands and other Restr.tinu of Competition l liO when issuing recommendations.
O ne might wond er whether development of these parnJid p rocedures may not end u p complic.tting the decision process, thereby extending the time frames. This uninten ded effect is especially perverse beCluse the aim of using non-bind ing instruments is the exact opposite: grater Aexibility. Jn the example of the Swiss Takeover Board, it was in fact deemed simpler :1nd mo re efficient fo r the Board to :1dopt :1 d ecision based on conventi:onal rules of :1d ministrative p roce-dure.
(ii) The-definition of the competent jurisdiction Non-binding acts must in princip~e be en:lctc-d by an :luthority with competent ju risd iction, as much from a fede r.J.Ji.st standpoint (Article 3 Cst) 1 2l 'lS owing to location, matter, o r functio n. l22 Jn o u r view, this d oes no t C' lCdud e a cert':lin Aexibility in the ctSe at hand when their effects ':lre limited , since jurisdiction can be inferred implicitly. Mo re ':lnd more legisbtion stipulates the competent authority to enact such laws and their objects. '" Tschonn<n (n 10) 421; Mull<r ond MUlkr.Crof (n 10) 377: Nurn (n 10) 190: S.nhc (n 80) 123; Richli (n I 0) I 56.
m Tsch:mncn (n 10) 422. e A-""ectiveness. It is in fac t especially nc-ccss:uy to m rry out bro ad co nsultations (m oddled on legislative p ro ced ut"C"s) fo r :1 non-binding text if the :luthority wishes to ensure th e su pport of its subjcct:s.12)
Com ul111riou
C itizens ca n participate to v;uying d·egr«S. from simple consultation and a true right to a hearing to joint devdo pment ot non-binding acts. The legisb tion may set out an o bligatio n to conduct consultations. as with the fo llowing r«ommendations: 
TJx right to n hmriug
Cener:tl procedural guarantees (An ide 29 Cst) trad itionally apply o nly to legal acts. However. the g rowing formalintion o f certain proced ur:tl aspects ':lppliClble to sub stantive acts sho ws that it would be im possible. at least conce ptually, to consider their ad optio n an 'administr.ttive pl'OCed ure' within the m eaning ofAn ide 2 9 Cst. Wert' the basis n ot to be found in A n ide 2 9 Cst, in our view it m ay be. if n ecessary, found in Article 8 Cst. Legal literature thus requires th e introductio n of a right to ':l hearing for notices, ':lgreements 1 2~ o r certain recommendatio n s with significant eA-'ects, fo r ex':lmple. those o f the Competition C ommissio n (art 45 para 2 of the Feder:tl Act on G rtds and o ther Restr:;a_ints of Compctition).HO.I3I T he law m ay intro duce it Clepressly. It h as done so in ':l nuanced manner, and only fo r acts with significant d Tects:
1~$ Rcg:trding this ;trgumC'm. stt J·D Odlcy :md L M~c-r, L 'Etill forr au di.f lllt'fgiu'qut': hudr dt' misr m «Utrrt' dts mrsurts fldir.tfrs rt r4mon • .,ln m m. m'irt' d'irfmo,nit' d'inn-gr~ (Payot. Lausann<' 1986) TJx quality of party ~islation m ay spell o ut the con d itions for recogni'Zing the q uality of pa rty to ':1. procedure le:1ding to the enactment of a non-binding ':l.Ct. This qu:1lity may dii-Te r from the regubr ru les of ad m inistro.tive procedure.
Under the former Feder:1l Act on Cartds and other Rcstr:lints of Competition, the Supreme Coun ..Uiow('d r~gularjons . srjpul:uing th:u i ntrr~sr('d p:tniB could not ~l:('rcise 11l thr rights of a party und er the administrati\·e procedure act (Loi sur Ia prorklurt" adminismuit't'} before the Cane! Commission, which was e m powered only to issue re<ommendations. I J) (iv) The pub lication and notification of non-binding State acts For ' :l.S long ' :l.S th e principle of secrecy prevails in government, th ere is no gener.;a_l o b lig:1tion to pub lish no n -b inding acts. Gradual ':l.dop tion of the pr inciple of tr:lnsparency will c hange this ord·e r. These acts, like o ther o ffici :;t] d ocuments, will in princip le beco me pub lic. subject to exceptions inte nded to pro tect cert:lin pub lic :;a_nd priva te interests deemed pre po nder.;a_nt. 1 34 Legislato rs, however, h':t.ve not w:~ited for this shift in pa rl.digm to progressively intro duce various pub licatio n oblig;n ions fo r gen eral and a:bstract :lets o r re po rting oblig;uio ns for ind ividual and concre te acts. A few examples with re-g:;trd to recommenda tio ns show this to be so:
T he Fede.ral Data Protection and Information Commissione r must inform the d epartment of competent jurisdiction or the Federal C hancellery of its recommendation re&uding the monitoring of federal bodies (Article 27(4) of the Federal Act on Data Protection) as wdl as the public more gener:llly where it is of gener:ll interest (Article 30{2) of the Federal Act on Dat:l Protection) .
' Most ICfill schohrs also favou r th e pub lication of ':l.gi'C"C'ments inte nd ed to :;tvoid r~latory acts to the e xte nt th':l.t they alfect individ uals no t party to the agn:ement. (v) The obligation to statethe-reasons for a non-binding act T h e o b lig:;ttion to St:lte the reasons fo r a non-b ind ing 'lCt must not be confUsed with the rt'quirement to j ustify the d erogatio n s from such acts as d iscussed in ter ms of effects. 1 37 Stemming from the right to a hetring, this t<'quireme nt app lies to leg:;a_l acts, more accur:ttdy to d«:ision s. as a contribution to the trnnsp:uency of j ustice. Applied to non-b ind ing 'lets, it would concern only in d ividu;~.l, "actu al 'lets th:lt have e A-""ects 'lnd that prejudice righ ts to a d egree of significance compar:tb le to that of decisions. Normative texts m:ty spe.cifically p~scribc such an oblig;u ion. The re :;~.re tv.·o examples of th is in fi nan cial law:
The aurhoril)''s rccommcndarion to disclose sharcholding; must be justified (Article 26 (2) of the Ordomum~ de I'Autoriti fklimle de surt'eillmJa des marchis fimmrien sur fes bou~s) . 0 8
Justification may "also result !Tom a n :;~dministratiVC' pnctice, as w ith the r«<mmend'l.tions of the Competition Commission (A.rtide 4 5(2) of the FC'dcn.l Act on Cartels and o the r Rcstnints of Com pctition),IY. ) in a n:port expb ining the grounds. 1 40
(vi) The method of decision
In cert:lin ctSes, the le-gislation may set out the method for de<:iding whether to :;~dopt :;t non-bin d ing :;~ct. One example illustr.tt<'s this: hand, refused to compensate a chttse maker ;lllegcdly prejudiced by an official warning concerning the risks associated with ronsumption of its chttse. 1 4) However. this path presents obv·ious fa ilings: one must prove the existence of a prejudice. and indemnificatio n is the sole remcdy. 146
(b) A new remedy• for non-bindi11g nrn
Civen these shortcomings. in 20 0 7 the federallegisbto r b ro ught into forcc a new remedy for no n-bind ing acts, which provides fo r the right of any person with a legitimate interest to require that the authority refrain from any illicit act. s, cease to arry out or revoke such :Jets, eliminate the effects thereof. o r recog nize such acts :lS illicit. The authority then rules by a d ecision (Article 25a of the Loi ftdh'a!t" mr In prociduu ndmini.Jf.rdtiw). 147 T he law of State responsibility, however, remains :Jvailable as a supplementary provision.
(r) 7/Je sperifc m.am: sperinl remedies
The legal system may also p rovide for special remedies intended for specific n onbinding acts.
Fo r infOrnutio n reb tcd to contestable political rights: by the recourse aga.inst \·iolation of politid rights: 148 for agrC"Cments the effects o f which limit competition: by me:tns dr:lwn from competition law: 149 fo r r:ldio ;1nd television progr:lms: OOsed on a speci6c procedure. 1 )0 C riminal proce-edings may also seJVe as the basis for j udicial control of nonbinding acts. This is the case with out-of<outt ;1greements in competition law. the violation of which is punishable by pen:ll sanctions. l~l
(d) Alternfllive control options
However. a judge's inteJVention is no t always possible. Jn this case, it is p referable to develop alternative mechanisms: 1 52 the introduction of politico-:Jdministrative controls. such :lS denunciation to the monitoring authority, l53 of public policy evaluatio n agencies. 1 ' >4 o r of mediation bodies. 1 ' >5 "' ATF 11 8lb 473, 48 1.
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